X, to react “at a series of constantly shifting geographical and political points” to the encroachments of the Soviet power. For as I have sought to show, it commits this country to a struggle which has for its objective nothing more substantial than the hope that in ten or fifteen years the Soviet power will, as the result of long frustration, “break up” or “mellow.” In this prolonged struggle the role of the United States is, according to Mr. to the policy of containment is not that it seeks to confront the Soviet power with American power, but that the policy is misconceived, and must result in a misuse of American power. Lippmann (1889–1974) was perhaps the most prominent journalist and public intellectual of his day. Walter Lippmann, The Cold War: A Study in US Foreign Policy (New York: Harper, 1947), 29–31, 35, 37–39. Even the quality of American and Soviet kitchens and what that represented could be part of the debate.
As the Cold War continued, it became a struggle not just between two political and military powers but between two ways of life or which of the two could better meet human needs. From the beginning, both containment and the Truman Doctrine had critics (see Walter Lippman’s The Cold War and Henry Wallace’s speech). Like containment, the Truman Doctrine became a fundamental part of America’s response to the confrontation with the Soviet Union. A manifestation of containment was the so-called Truman Doctrine announced by President Truman about a year after Kennan sent his response to Washington. X, became the basis for the policy of containment that in one way or another guided America’s actions toward the Soviet Union until the end of the Cold War. Quickly dubbed the “ Long Telegram,” its analysis and recommendations, along with a version that Kennan published in the journal Foreign Affairs under the pseudonym Mr. In response to a request from the State Department, in February 1946, George Kennan (1904–2005), the Chargé at the American Embassy in Moscow, sent a telegram that offered an explanation for Soviet actions. By late 1945 and early 1946, concern had already arisen about Soviet attitudes and actions in Europe. Allies during the Second World War, the United States and the Soviet Union fell out quickly once it ended.
0 kommentar(er)
